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 DEDICATION 
 Self-Deception can be summed up thusly – causing one’s self to see the world 
the way we want it to be, rather than the way that it really is. When we lie to ourselves, 
we use our hopes and dreams, our memories, and even our prejudices to construct the 
vision that we have of the world around us. Self-Deception causes us to take only that 
information which strengthens and affirms our world view, and reject that which 
opposes it. Sometimes it can even cause us to see those who have a different vision of 
the world as “other”, and somehow less than human. This most terrible incarnation of 
Self-Deception can even enable groups and individuals to engage in acts of terror upon 
their fellow man. 
 I would like to dedicate my study of Self-Deception to the victims of the act of 
terror perpetrated at the Boston Marathon. May our growing understanding of this 
complex phenomenon serve to break down the walls that separate us as individuals, and 
help us to understand and care for each other more completely. May this knowledge 
serve a small part in the effort to end intolerance and the violent hatred of that which is 
different. May future generations use what we have learned to develop their own sense 
of the deep interconnection between persons both locally and globally, and stomp out 
egocentric thinking. 
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 Abstract 
Self-Deception creates a mental state in which an individual unquestioningly 
maintains a belief that has clearly been refuted and proven faulty by some information 
which the self-deceiver has come to possess.  However, aside from personality trait 
measures, no measurement techniques have been developed which capture the act of 
Self-Deception in a laboratory setting. In order to fill this need, the current research 
sought to examine the relationship between self-deception and cognitive dissonance, 
and used this relationship to create the Double Standards scale.  
In the current research, participants completed several surveys online. They then 
came into the lab, where they were be randomly assigned to Affirmed and Deaffirmed 
conditions.  
It was found that asking participants to recall their past behaviors condom use 
caused those participants to significantly lower their estimation of the average person’s 
likelihood to use condoms, but not to change their ratings of their own likelihood. It was 
also found that Affirmed participants did not lower their ratings of others as much as 
participants in the Deaffirmed condition. The implications for these findings are 
discussed.  
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CHAPTER I 
DOUBLE STANDARDS IN SELF-DECEPTION 
The act of Self-Deception has fascinated psychologists for many years. 
Seemingly, in the pursuit of a descriptive account of this phenomenon, more questions 
have been raised than answered. What is Self-Deception? How and why to people 
deceive themselves? Is Self-Deception intentional? Interpersonally, the deception of 
others requires an individual to hold some specific information while leading another 
individual to believe some contradictory information. If Self-Deception is structurally 
similar to interpersonal deception, then it seems that the Self-Deceiving person must 
intentionally deceive themselves, as well as hold a pair of fundamentally opposed 
beliefs. In other words, a deceiver believes x and brings it about that the deceived 
believes not-x; since the self-deceiver plays both roles, they must believe both x and 
not-x.  
According to Davidson (1985), self-deception comes quite naturally to people, 
and yet it poses a huge problem for philosophical psychology. Intuitively, it seems that 
self-deception would be impossible (Haight, 1980). Deception is the act of one 
individual who knows a certain fact deceiving another who does not know that fact, and 
thus one person should not be able to deceive themselves because they cannot both 
know and not know the same thing. However, it cannot be impossible since we do in 
fact deceive ourselves (Gur & Sackheim, 1979). 
Empirical research into Self-Deception, however, denies the literal account of 
Self-Deception favored by “pure” philosophers. Instead, Self-Deception can be 
explained by looking at the egocentrically biasing effects that our desires have on our 
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beliefs. A person desiring x can make it easier for themselves to believe x by 
influencing the way that he or she gathers and interprets evidence relevant to the truth 
of x (Mele, 2001).  
The Preservation of the Self 
 The “self” can be conceptualized as a highly complex system which consists of 
multiple structures, both cognitive and evaluative, as well as the regulation of these 
structures (Filipp, & Klauer, 1985; James, 1980; Markus, & Wurf, 1987; Mead, 1934;). 
The self as a whole, like many systems, is in a constant flux between stability and 
change. For the most part, individuals have a sense of being the same person throughout 
their entire life, and actually remain so relative to various aspects of themselves. The 
entire premise of personality psychology is that we are highly stable in certain central 
dimensions (Bengtson, Reedy, & Gordon, 1985). However there is also a pervasive 
need to adapt in order to properly develop. Many studies have shown that we adjust the 
“self” in response to even minor situational demands (Hannover, Pohlmann, Springer, 
& Roeder, 2005). While these adjustments need not be completely accurate, they must 
be realistic in order to properly regulate our behaviors (Greve & Wentura, 2003).  As 
necessary and frequent as these changes are, though, we often experience loss when we 
change those things about ourselves that seem to be a major part of who we are (Baltes, 
Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 2006).  In fact, when we are presented with information 
which directly contradicts or attacks our self-image, Self-Deception may be used to 
preserve that image.  
 Because of these constant adjustments to our self-image due to new and 
situational information, it is likely that we would integrate information with some 
3 
 
regularity which would decrease the positive aspect of how we see ourselves. Surbey 
(2011) suggests that Self-Deception is a mechanism which allows us to maintain our 
self-image by balancing the true with the desirable; she demonstrated empirically that 
those who do not engage in self-deception have significantly lower self-esteem than 
those who do engage in self-deception.    
The Information Processing Bias 
The specific ways in which one might deceive one’s self vary, but the common 
theme is that information which affirms our held beliefs is preferred over information 
that contradicts our held beliefs, or non-affirming information (Mele, 1997). Describing 
Self-Deception as having a preference for affirming versus non-affirming information 
has an advantage over more literal accounts of Self-Deception, in that literal accounts 
require that a person hold “false” information in the conscious mind while holding 
“true” information in the unconscious mind (Gur & Sackeim, 1979). It has been 
demonstrated experimentally that, contrary to this literal account of Self-Deception, 
people can deceive themselves by not processing non-affirming information in the first 
place.  
In Ditto and Lopez’s (1992) study on preferred versus non-preferred 
conclusions, 30 participants were confronted with a judgment situation in which they 
had little to no preference for one conclusion over another, and 30 participants did  have 
a preference for a specific conclusion. This variable of preference was manipulated by 
establishing the likeability of two potential candidates for partnership on a task through 
evaluations the candidates supposedly filled out about the participants’ performance on 
a previous task. In the no preference condition, the candidates “rated” participants 
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equally well and fairly highly. In the preference condition, one candidate rated the 
participant highly, while the other rated the participant poorly. A second manipulated 
variable established the performance of the candidates the participants were to choose 
from. In the target positive condition, preferred were rated highly, and the other was 
rated poorly, while in the target negative condition, preferred candidates were rated 
poorly, while the other was rated highly. In the no preference condition, performance 
was randomized. The dependent variable measured how long it took for participants to 
judge the performance of the candidates, believing they would work with the one they 
deemed most intelligent. It was found that participants required less information to 
decide that a dislikeable (non-preferred) candidate was less intelligent (target positive) 
than that he was more intelligent (target negative). In other words, participants more 
easily made decisions in bias-consistent conditions, compared to bias-inconsistent 
conditions.   
Self-Deceptive Techniques  
Avoiding non-affirming information. One can imagine a variety of situations 
when people would avoid further searches for information that would be incompatible 
with their goals or desires. For example, some will avoid searching for an alternative 
product after already committing to a purchase (Olson & Zanna, 1979), or even avoid 
medical testing for a deadly disease due to fear of the possible negative result.  
 Dawson, Savitsky, and Dunning (2006) examined people’s willingness to 
submit to medical testing in a two part study; the first of which measured their 
willingness to be tested for a treatable disease, while the second measured their 
willingness to be tested for an untreatable disease.  Participants in the first study were 
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asked to imagine that they were at an elevated risk for a fictitious disease called 
Thioamineacetylase (TAA) Enzyme Deficiency. The first variable, severity, was 
manipulated by telling one group that the disease involves no adverse symptoms, 
whereas the other group was told that TAA deficiency places people at a substantially 
elevated risk for severe pancreatic disorders. The second variable, treatability, was 
manipulated by telling one group that the deficiency is practically impossible to alter, 
and the other was told that they have a great deal of control over their TAA levels. All 
participants reported their interest in submitting to a diagnostic test for TAA deficiency 
and, using a 2x2 ANOVA, a main effect for severity was revealed. This demonstrated 
that participants were more interested in the test when the disorder was described as 
severe. However, this was only true in the treatable condition – participants were not 
interested in diagnostic testing when the disease was described as untreatable.  
 In the second part of Dawson et al.’s (2006) study, participants believed 
themselves to be facing a choice about a diagnostic test for a real disease called alopecia 
areata. The variables were manipulated in the same way as the first part of the 
experiment. Those in the high severity condition were told that the disease can 
dramatically slow the rate of new hair production, and those who were in the other 
condition were not told this. Treatability was manipulated by telling one group that the 
condition was not treatable, and the other group was told that it was. All conditions said 
they would be willing to undergo formal genetic testing for alopecia areata save for one, 
the severe and untreatable condition. The result of the second study demonstrated the 
same pattern of responding as the first – That the perception of high consequences in a 
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situation where one would have no control to treat the disorder would rather not know if 
they have it.  
Seeking affirming information. The most obvious case of this type of biased 
information search that comes to mind is political. If a person is liberal, they will tend to 
watch news channels like MSNBC, whereas a conservative person will tend to watch 
FOX News. By selectively choosing one’s sources of information, it is likely that the 
bulk of the information they gather will support their existing worldview (Frey, 1986).  
 Trope and Neter (1994), in two studies, presented participants with immediate 
performance outcomes (study 1) or asked them to recall past experiences (study 2). In 
both studies, participants in negative feedback and neutral control conditions actively 
sought subsequent positive feedback about their abilities, which demonstrates a natural 
(or negative response driven) urge to hear information which bolsters self-affirmation. 
In the positive feedback condition, participants had already received self-affirming 
information, and were significantly more likely to be willing to hear subsequent 
feedback about their weaknesses.  
 In a third study by Trope and Neter (1994), based on the previous two studies, it 
was hypothesized that individuals would seek positive experiences when new negative 
feedback was made available to them, and that they would do this in order to cope with 
the emotional costs of the negative feedback. The experiment consisted of three parts. 
In the first, participants performed a personality test and received initial, highly positive 
feedback. In the second part of the experiment, allegedly unrelated to the first, subjects 
performed an intelligence test and received initial feedback indicating that their overall 
score was either excellent, above average, average, or poor. The third part of the 
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experiment was a waiting period during which subjects could read positive feedback 
from the earlier personality test and engage in a neutral activity (reading magazines) or 
some other activity. Three decision conditions were instituted in the waiting period. In 
the optional feedback condition, subjects were asked to tell the experimenter at the end 
of the waiting period whether they would like to receive detailed feedback about their 
intelligence test results. In the mandatory feedback condition, subjects were simply told 
that they would receive such feedback at the end of the waiting period. Control subjects 
waited for the experiment to continue without expecting detailed feedback regarding the 
intelligence test results. 
 Subjects who were offered new feedback regarding their intelligence spent more 
time reading positive personality information than did subjects who were not offered 
such feedback. In contrast, when subjects were not given the option of rejecting the 
offered feedback, the time they devoted to reading the positive personality feedback 
increased with the difficulty of receiving the new feedback, namely, with the negativity 
of the new feedback. These results are a demonstration of how individuals try to support 
themselves emotionally with self-affirming information, and will do so more with the 
threat of receiving information which threatens their worldview.  
Taken together, these three studies demonstrate a need for self-affirming 
information. This need leads people to seek sources which will affirm their previously 
held beliefs, but when their self-affirmation goals have been met, they are more willing 
to hear unwelcome information. Therefore, it appears that people are willing to avoid 
telling themselves a whole truth by searching for comforting information, but become 
more flexible on the matter when they feel secure (Kumashiro & Sedikides, 2005).  
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Selective attention. Obviously, not every situation requires one to seek out 
information. Sometimes conflicting opinions and ideas are readily available in our 
environment. By selectively attending to preferred aspects of the available information, 
however, it is still possible to bias one’s encoding. To return to the example of politics, 
a person might find themselves in a group with two distinct divisions in conversation – 
one subgroup talking in favor of a socially progressive policy while the other subgroup 
is talking against it. Depending on that person’s inherent bias, they can choose to pay 
attention to one conversation over the other.  
Some of the most direct evidence for selective attention is provided by eye 
movement tracking studies. Mood was induced upon two age groups – young adults (18 
to 25 yrs.) and older adults (58-89 yrs.) – in a study by Isaazowitz, Toner, Goren, and 
Wilson (2008), which demonstrated eye gaze preference between negative and positive 
affective stimuli. Mood was induced using the continuous music technique (CMT; Eich 
& Metcalfe, 1989), which divided them into positive, neutral, and negative conditions. 
Following this task, participants were seated in front of the eye tracker. A 17-point 
calibration permitted accurate measurement of gaze.  The participants were told that 
they would be viewing a slide show and would watch naturally, as if watching 
television at home. Overall, participants tended to look away from angry or sad faces, 
and toward happy or afraid faces. Younger adults demonstrated mood-congruent gaze – 
they preferred happy or neutral faces when in a positive condition, and angry or afraid 
faces when in the negative condition. Older adults tended, however to have no 
preference when in the positive or neutral condition, but regulated their mood in the 
negative condition with a preference for looking at happy faces.  
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While there are clear age differences, it is apparent that both groups are 
selectively attending for specific emotional states. While younger adults seem to affirm 
their current emotional state by attending to congruent stimuli, older adults will self-
regulate their negative emotional states by looking toward positive stimuli. In both 
cases, the groups are not attending to the overall stimulus, but picking out preferred 
information through eye gaze. 
Selective skepticism. What happens, though, when despite selectively attending 
to preferential information, disagreeable information is encoded into the mind? This 
unwelcome information can still be rejected through a biased interpretation of that 
which is attitude-inconsistent. For instance, if a person is convinced that the Obama 
bailouts were generally positive for the state of the economy, and was presented with 
data from a reputable economist that demonstrated the overall effect was a slowdown in 
recovery, logic states that this person would probably begin to see how the bailouts 
could have been bad. Conversely, Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) demonstrated that 
selective skepticism can actually lead people to become more polarized in these kinds 
of situations.  
Dawson, Gilovich, and Regan (2002) argue that people tend to approach 
agreeable propositions with a bias toward confirmation and disagreeable position with a 
bias toward disconfirmation in a study on motivated reasoning. To divide their 
participants into motivational groups, they used the Emotional Lability Inventory (ELI; 
Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Pinel, Jordan, & Simon, 1993), which is designed to 
place nearly all respondents in either a high emotionality or low emotionality category. 
Participants in this study were informed of their classification, even though it is 
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unambiguous by the wording of the measure, and told that their classification is either 
potentially deadly or that the other classification is potentially deadly. Participants who 
were told that their classification could be deadly vastly outperformed the other group 
on the Wason Selection Task (in which the task rule implied their own early death), 
which is designed so that disconfirmation is the best possible strategy. Thus, there is a 
clear bias towards disconfirming a highly uncomfortable piece of information, 
regardless of its factual basis.  
Consequently, because of selective skepticism, people are able to process a 
variety of conflicting pieces of information without ever changing their held belief. 
With a bias toward disconfirming that which they do not want to believe they are able to 
convince themselves that their own viewpoint continues to be supported, regardless of 
contradiction.  
Manipulated memory. The next progression of deception accepts that a person 
may attend to unwanted information, accept it at the time of encoding to memory, but 
posits that they might not remember it correctly later. Rather, inconsistent information 
could be simply forgotten, or misremembered as either consistent with their held beliefs 
or as neutral. Specifically, a person may easily remember all of their victorious chess 
matches, but fail to recall the even greater number of losses they incurred when facing 
superior players. One may even distort the memory of their failures to overemphasize 
external causes for the bad results.  
Empirically, this kind of memory bias has been demonstrated in self-
improvement. After taking a study skills class, participants in Conway and Ross’ (1984) 
study recalled their previous study skills as being lower than they originally rated then 
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before the class. This serves the function of confirming their improvement as a result of 
the extra training. Later, they even misremembered course performance as being better 
than it actually was to support the false claim of improving.  
This same type of self-enhancing recall bias has also been shown related to self-
reported alcohol consumption. Gmel and Daeppen (2007) chose men and women who 
regularly consumed alcohol from a population of patients in a hospital emergency ward. 
They measured alcohol consumption with a seven day diary the patients kept. It was 
found that free recall of the amount of alcohol consumed decreased significantly over a 
period of seven days as compared to one day after the journal was turned over to the 
researchers. This demonstrated that the patients had a desire to reduce the perceived 
amount of alcohol they consumed, and improve their self-image.  
The Link between Dissonance and Deception 
 It is clear that self-deception comes in a wide variety of forms in order to 
become applicable to a range of situations. On the surface these methods may seem to 
be very different, but on closer inspection a commonality begins to emerge. In the 
paradigms described above, participants have made an attempt through self-deception to 
make themselves appear “better” than they behaved in reality. This desire to live up to 
an idealized image, and the discrepancy between it and their actual behavior, has been 
described by Elliot Aronson in a different context. He stated that,  
“[a]t the very heart of dissonance theory, where it makes 
its strongest predictions, we are not dealing with any two 
cognitions; rather, we are usually dealing with the self-
concept and some behavior. If dissonance exists, it is 
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because the individual’s behavior is inconsistent with his 
self-concept.” (Scott-Kakures, 2009). 
When people feel self-affirmed, they are typically reminded of the values they 
see as important to themselves (e.g., their artistic, humanist, or scientific orientation) or 
behaviors of theirs they see as being positive and consistent with their self-image (e.g., 
their kindness to others). By reflecting on their important values or past positive 
behaviors, people are reminded that they are moral and efficacious individuals, which 
serves to affirm their self-worth. A cornerstone of self-affirmation theory is the idea that 
specific attacks on one’s abilities or morals – such as failure on a test – do not need to 
be dealt with directly, but rather can be addressed at a more general level by restoring or 
reaffirming a global sense of self-worth (Steele, 1988). Thus, self-affirmation makes 
people less motivated to defend themselves against a specific attack, as their sense of 
self-worth is assured despite the threat posed by the attack. 
However, when an individual’s self-image is threatened and they cannot 
reaffirm themselves through more global means, two opposing viewpoints are created 
which causes dissonance. For example, “I am a good person” may conflict with the 
behavior “I purposely insulted that other person for their reckless driving.” In order to 
deal with the dissonant situation, a variety of self-deceptive techniques may be used so 
that the conflict can be resolved.  
Clearly, all of the above mentioned forms of self-deception can be applied to 
information which is contradictory to our self-image. But one can imagine an even more 
complex form of self-deception in which the self-image is preserved and the conflicting 
information is processed and accepted. Similarly to selective skepticism, the double 
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standard uses biased reasoning to create two standards for the evaluation of information. 
Conversely though, when a double standard is present the information itself is not 
evaluated in a biased way. It is the situational rules which become biased in favor of the 
self-deceiver. If the individual in the example used a double standard, their solution 
may sound something like, “It is wrong to insult people, but that specific person 
deserves it because of their own bad behavior.”  
The Present Study 
 Since Anna Freud’s (1936) book about the ego, psychologists have proposed 
and studied many different ways that the mind protects itself from information which 
would otherwise harm our self-concept, such as denial and repression (Markus & Wurf, 
1987), self-serving biases, reappraisal, doubting, and rationalization (Swann & Hill, 
1982), and self-immunization by the peripheral adjustment of concepts (Greve & 
Wentura, 2003). All forms of “reality negotiation” and reinterpretation entail a certain 
degree of deceit (Greve & Wentura, 2010).  
 According to the pseudo-rationality model of self-deception proposed by Michel 
et al. (2010), one particularly salient component of self-deception is ego-centric 
standardization (double standard), which is consistent with the above discussion 
concerning self-affirmation. Along with an ego-centric bias concerning information, 
there are also two standards of evaluation involved: one which is applied to self, and 
one which is applied to others (Beauregard, & Dunning, 2001). Based on this, the 
pseudo-rationality model is closely related to selective skepticism, as well as the 
previous explanation of double standards. The presence of separate standards in self-
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deception has been repeatedly noted in the literature, clearly indicating the use of a 
double standard as a unique and specific form of self-deception.  
In this work, the author sought to establish an empirical connection between 
Self-Deception and the reduction of Cognitive Dissonance. The literature consistently 
suggests that a variety of self-deceptive techniques could be used to affirm the self-
image. However, when presented with direct and dissonant self-relevant information, it 
seems that the use of a double standard would be most effective to protect the self-
image. This is because the information itself cannot be manipulated, and so the 
situational rules surrounding the relevance that the information has for one’s self must 
be manipulated instead.   
In order to capture this behavior, the author has created a new form of 
measurement called the Double Standards scale. To make the connection between 
dissonance and Self-Deception clearer, The Double Standards scale uses a similar 
framework to one featured in a Cognitive Dissonance study by Stone, Aronson, Crain, 
and Winslow (1994). In their study, dissonance was created by having participants 
advocate the use of condoms and subsequently reminding them of their own past 
failures to use condoms. Those participants who were in the dissonant condition bought 
significantly more condoms at the end of the study in order to reduce their dissonance 
than participants in any of the three control conditions.  
For this study, participants will complete the Double Standards scale. Then, at a 
later point in time, they will advocate the use of condoms, reflect on their past condom 
use behaviors, and then retake the Double Standards scale. A comparison will be made 
between their scores on the scale prior to and after this manipulation.  
15 
 
It is predicted that participants will not feel that their self-image is under attack 
prior to the experimental manipulation, and will rate themselves similarly to the way 
they rate others on condom use likelihood. After the manipulation, participants should 
experience dissonance as suggested by the Stone (et al., 1994) study. Thus, it is also 
predicted that these participants will feel the need to reduce the dissonance and reaffirm 
themselves, and will do this by changing their ratings so that their self-ratings are 
significantly higher than their ratings of others’ likelihood to use condoms. 
If it can be determined that participants significantly lower their ratings of the 
average person’s likelihood to use condoms, without lowering their ratings of their own 
likelihood, after thinking about their own past behaviors, it will serve as evidence for 
the use of a double standard type Self-Deception. This is because both pieces of 
information will have to be accepted (condom use is a smart choice/I have failed to use 
condoms), and the participant will demonstrate an unrealistic belief, by comparison, 
which will be self-affirming.  
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Participants 
 Data was collected from volunteers at Eastern Kentucky University. All 
volunteers were undergraduate psychology students participating for partial course 
credit. The study was designed to have participants complete the Double Standards 
scale online via the SONA system, and then come into the lab to complete the 
experimental condition later. The initial sample collected online comprised N = 200 
participants. They were 27.5% male and 71.5% female, 1% declining to indicate their 
sex. 90% of the participants self-identified as White, 3.5% as Black, 1% as Hispanic, 
1% as Asian, .5% as Middle Eastern, .5% as Indian, .5% as Guatemalan, 1% as 
multiracial, and 2% declined to identify their race. The average age of the participants 
was M = 23.69 (SD = 7.18), ranging from 18 to 52 years.  
 In the experimental condition, the sample was significantly reduced. Only 17 
people accepted the invitation to participate in the second part of the study, 8 of which 
were randomly assigned to the Affirmed group, and 9 of which were randomly assigned 
to the Deaffirmed group. All participants in this condition self-reported as white and 
female. The experimental sample had the same approximate age as the initial sample. 
Only these participants were included in the experimental analysis.  
Materials  
The double standards scale. The Double Standards scale asks participants to 
evaluate the likelihood of their own use, as well as the average person’s use, of 
condoms across 13 situations. Two averages are calculated – the average self-rating and 
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the average other-rating. In this study, participants responded using a 6-point scale, a 
higher rating indicating a higher likelihood to use condoms. See Appendix A for the 
Self-Ratings section, and Appendix B for the Other-Ratings section.  
Data collected online indicated that participants rate their own likelihood to use 
condoms at about 75.34% (M = 4.52, SD = 1.26, 95% CI = 4.37 – 4.71). The same 
participants rated the likelihood of the average person to use condoms at about 75.54% 
(M = 4.53, SD = 1.27, 95% CI = 4.35 – 4.71). The internal consistency of both Self-
Ratings and Other-Ratings was very high. Self-Ratings produced a Cronbach’s alpha of 
.923, and Other-Ratings produced a Cronbach’s alpha of .927.  
Condom use information sheet. In order to establish and increase the salience 
of the “goodness” of using condoms, all participants were given an information sheet 
about the benefits of and statistics about condom use in the experimental condition. The 
participants were asked to read the information out loud to the researcher. See appendix 
C for the specific materials used.  
Condom use essay. Two groups were present within the experimental 
condition. One group was asked to think about past situations in which they decided 
that using condoms was the best choice. They were also asked to write a brief essay 
describing the reasoning behind their choices. This group was named the “Affirmed” 
condition, as the manipulation was intended to reinforce the participants’ good choices. 
See Appendix D for the specific materials used. 
 The second group was asked to think about past situations in which they decided 
that not using condoms was the best choice. They were also asked to write a brief essay 
describing the reasoning behind their choices. This group was named the “Deaffirmed” 
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condition, as the manipulation was intended to reinforce the participants’ bad choices.  
See Appendix E for the specific materials used.  
Procedure 
 It was theoretically important for this research that participants directly 
contradict themselves to ensure that we could infer the use of a double standard. Thus, 
all participants first completed the Double Standards scale online via the SONA system, 
along with providing some basic demographic information. After completing this part 
of the study, they were invited to come into the lab for some extra class credit to 
participate in the second half. When participants came into the lab, we first had them 
read out loud the condom information sheet, and then complete one of the two possible 
essays. Participants were randomly assigned to either the Affirmed condition or 
Deaffirmed condition. After reading the information sheet and completing their 
respective essays, which served as the experimental manipulation for this study, they 
again completed the Double Standards scale. After finishing, they were debriefed and 
thanked for their time.  
Analysis  
 The design of this study included both within groups and between groups 
elements. First, all participants completed the Double Standards scale online, and then 
again in the lab after receiving the experimental manipulation. Therefore, it was 
necessary to use a test which could accurately compute within groups, or repeated 
measures, differences. Second, the experimental manipulation had two levels – 
Affirmed and Deaffirmed – which split the experimental condition into two independent 
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groups. To encompass all of this variance at once, the variables were entered into a 
Repeated Measures General Linear Model (GLM).  
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Repeated Measures GLM  
Self-ratings. Repeated measures GLM was utilized to simultaneously asses the 
within and between groups differences in Self-Ratings on the Double Standards scale. 
No significant difference could be established between the initial online condition (M = 
4.67) and the experimental condition (M = 4.66, F (1, 15) = 0 .002, p = n.s.). There was 
also no significant difference between scores in the Affirmed (M = 4.82) and 
Deaffirmed (M = 4.67) groups for Self-Ratings (F (1, 15) = .367. p = n.s.).  See Figures 
1 and 21. 
Other-ratings. Repeated measures GLM was utilized to simultaneously asses 
the within and between groups differences in Other-Ratings on the Double Standards 
scale. Other-Ratings were found to be significantly higher in the initial online condition 
(M = 4.68) than in the experimental condition (M = 3.57, F (1, 15) = 8.944, p < .01, eta-
squared = .374). The difference between the Affirmed (M = 3.98) and Deaffirmed (M = 
3.21) groups approached significance for Other-Ratings (F (1, 15) = 2.115, p = .166, 
eta-squared = .124), but could not be officially established as significant. See Figures 1 
and 2.  
 
 
 
 
1All figures listed in Appendix F. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
 The current research had one main goal. First and foremost, it was the purpose 
of this study to establish a theoretical connection between Cognitive Dissonance and 
Self-Deception, demonstrating Self-Deception as a unique method of dissonance 
reduction. To summarize, Dissonance theory makes its strongest predictions when there 
is a disagreement between the self-concept and a specific behavior. More specifically, 
dissonance arises when we engage in a behavior that we know is bad, because it is only 
natural that we want to believe that we are good.  
 If Self-Deception can be used to preserve our self-concept, or self-image, by 
balancing true information (I engage in bad behavior) with a desirable state (I am a 
good person), it logically follows that Self-Deception reduces dissonance. However, 
simply stating that Self-Deception balances the true with the desirable does not tell us 
exactly how the two are balanced. For the current work, it was proposed that the 
egocentric standardization, otherwise known as the double standard, provided the 
strongest explanatory model.  
 In other words, it is possible to maintain one’s belief that a specific behavior is 
bad in general, and apply that rule for other people, but still assert another set of rules 
for one’s self, thus preserving one’s self-image by making the behavior not bad. This 
makes sense theoretically and fits with current literature, but demonstrating this 
behavior empirically is difficult. In fact, before this study, it hasn’t been done. The 
question then becomes, how does one demonstrate empirically the use of a double 
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standard? Furthermore, how does one establish empirically that the double standard is 
used as dissonance reduction?  
First, it is necessary to observe that the double standard is not being applied 
when the self-image is not under attack by dissonance. The results of the analysis in this 
study demonstrate the participants rated themselves and the average person with the 
same overall likelihood to use condoms. There was no significant difference between 
the ratings. Thus, it appears that the participants were applying the same set of rules to 
themselves and to others. The assumption being made at this stage is that participants 
gauge their estimates of the average use of condoms on their own past behaviors, as 
well as their held beliefs about using condoms. Obviously the participants probably 
won’t have direct knowledge about the condom use behaviors of others, and so they 
must make adjustments from their own behaviors to estimate the average person’s use 
of condoms.  
Next, the double standard needs to manifest when the self-image is under attack. 
In the current work, participants’ self-images were attacked by reminding them 
specifically about their past condom use behaviors after asking them to publically state 
the dangers of not using condoms. When a double standard is being used, we should see 
participants rating themselves just as highly as they did when the self-image was not 
under attack. We should also see participants applying the new, adjusted standard to 
others.  
If participants are estimating the condom use behaviors of others based on their 
own behaviors, their ratings of others should be lowered when the participants are 
reminded of their own choices to not use condoms in the past. Logically, this reminder 
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should cause them to lower their ratings of themselves to the same degree that they 
lowered their ratings of others. However, when this reminder is made to feel like an 
attack on the self-image by making the dangers of not using condoms more salient, 
participants will be motivated to protect their self-image. This can be done by reasoning 
that the specific situations in which they decided not to use condoms were unique, 
special circumstances. Those situations become the exception and not the rule, and so 
the participants are able to maintain that they are good and that their likelihood to use 
condoms in general is just as good as it was before they were reminded of these 
situations.  
This is exactly what we see in the data for this study. There was no significant 
difference from the initial Self-Ratings online and the Self-Ratings in the experimental 
condition. However, there was a significant decrease in Other-Ratings in the 
experimental condition. This effect could only have been caused by reminding the 
participants of their own behaviors, and reminding them of the importance of using 
condoms.  
Participants in the Affirmed group were given the chance to affirm themselves 
by only focusing on self-affirming past behaviors, whereas participants in the 
Deaffirmed group were urged to focus on the opposite. From the literature review, we 
see that selective attention to self-affirming information is a self-deceptive technique 
which could have been applied to the conditions in this study. While there was a small 
effect between the Affirmed and Deaffirmed groups in this direction – Affirmed 
participants rated others slightly higher than Deaffirmed participants – this difference 
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was not statistically significant. The stronger model still appears to be the Double 
Standard, or egocentric standardization.  
A simple social comparison effect also seems to be ruled out. Participants could 
relieve dissonance and reaffirm themselves by lowering their ratings of themselves, but 
lowering their ratings of others more. This would allow them to believe that they were 
still more likely than the average person to use condoms. However, this is not the case 
either because the participants in this study didn’t change their ratings of themselves at 
all, even though they did lower their ratings of others by a significant margin.  
Not only was the current research successful in demonstrating a link between 
Self-Deception and Cognitive Dissonance, in the process of developing a study capable 
of demonstrating this connection, a method of measuring the actual performance of 
dissonance reducing Self-Deception in the form of a double standard has been 
suggested. While the Double Standards scale was specifically written in a format which 
reflected past dissonance research using condom use as a framework, it might be 
possible to apply this method in a variety of frameworks. As long as participants rate 
themselves and others in the performance of a specific behavior, and that behavior is 
susceptible to value judgments which are self-relevant, it should theoretically be 
possible to repeat the effect demonstrated in the current work. That is, as long as the 
method is truly measuring the performance of a double standard.  
 There were, however, some important limitations in the current work. The huge 
drop-off of participants between the initial and experimental condition was massive. 
This may have been due to the nature of the study – people might have been put off by 
the prospect of coming into the lab to do a study about the use of condoms. Because of 
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this, the sample in the experimental condition was very small. While statistical 
significance was achieved in the predicted pattern, a larger sample may garner very 
different results. Especially since the sample was not only small but extremely 
demographically limited. Only white females participated in the second half, which may 
indicate important differences between them and other groups. With a more diverse 
sample, it is entirely possible that a different pattern altogether could emerge.  
In the future, this highly significant research should be replicated with these 
limitations in mind. Repackaging the Double Standards scale in a different behavioral 
framework will test its ability as a method to detect the use of a double standard. This 
change should also eliminate the complications caused by using condom related 
behaviors as the basis for the study. Further research may develop the observed and 
theoretical connection between dissonance and self-deception, as well as provide the 
psychological research community with a powerful tool which measures the 
performance of a behavior only before measures using personality trait surveys.  
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Appendix A 
Double Standards Self-Ratings 
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Listed below are questions concerning your personal use of condoms. Please 
provide a response for every question, concerning your likelihood to use condoms 
in each of the following situations. 
Just met your partner at a bar that night.  
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
Just met your partner at a party that night.  
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
You or your partner is on birth control.  
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
You've been exclusive with your partner for a week.  
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
You've been exclusive with your partner for a month. 
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
You've been exclusive with your partner for 3 months.  
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
You've been exclusive with your partner for 6 months.  
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
You've been exclusive with your partner for 1 year +.  
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
Your partner insists that they don't have any diseases.  
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
You or your partner is sterile.  
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
Your partner tells you they don't want to use a condom.  
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
You or your partner thinks that wearing a condom could decrease performance.  
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Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
Likelihood of using a condom in general.  
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
Double Standards Other-Ratings 
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Listed below are questions concerning the average person’s use of condoms. Please 
provide a response for every question, concerning their likelihood to use condoms 
in each of the following situations. 
Just met their partner at a bar that night.  
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
Just met their partner at a party that night.  
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
They or their partner is on birth control.  
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
They've been exclusive with their partner for a week.  
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
They've been exclusive with their partner for a month.  
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
They've been exclusive with their partner for 3 months.  
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
They've been exclusive with their partner for 6 months.  
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
They've been exclusive with their partner for 1 year +.  
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
Their partner insists that they don't have any diseases.  
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
They or their partner is sterile. 
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
Their partner tells them that they don't want to use a condom.  
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
They or their partner thinks that wearing a condom could decrease performance.  
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Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
Likelihood of using a condom in general.  
Not Ever  1             2         3                4           5            6      Every Time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C 
Condom Use Information Sheet  
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Consistent and correct use of the male latex condom reduces the risk of 
sexually transmitted disease (STD) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 
transmission. However, condom use cannot provide absolute protection against 
any STD. The most reliable ways to avoid transmission of STDs are to abstain 
from sexual activity, or to be in a long-term mutually monogamous relationship 
with an uninfected partner.  However, many infected persons may be unaware of 
their infection because STDs often are asymptomatic and unrecognized.  
Condom effectiveness for STD and HIV prevention has been demonstrated by 
both laboratory and epidemiologic studies. Evidence of condom effectiveness is also 
based on theoretical and empirical data regarding the transmission of different STDs, 
the physical properties of condoms, and the anatomic coverage or protection provided 
by condoms. 
Laboratory studies have shown that latex condoms provide an effective barrier 
against even the smallest STD pathogens. 
Epidemiologic studies that compare rates of HIV infection between condom 
users and nonusers who have HIV-infected sex partners demonstrate that consistent 
condom use is highly effective in preventing transmission of HIV. Similarly, 
epidemiologic studies have shown that condom use reduces the risk of many other 
STDs. However, the exact magnitude of protection has been difficult to quantify 
because of numerous methodological challenges inherent in studying private behaviors 
that cannot be directly observed or measured. 
Theoretical and empirical basis for protection: Condoms can be expected to 
provide different levels of protection for various STDs, depending on differences in 
how the diseases or infections are transmitted. Male condoms may not cover all infected 
areas or areas that could become infected.  Thus, they are likely to provide greater 
protection against STDs that are transmitted only by genital fluids (STDs such as 
gonorrhea, chlamydia, trichomoniasis, and HIV infection) than against infections that 
are transmitted primarily by skin-to-skin contact, which may or may not infect areas 
covered by a condom (STDs such as genital herpes, human papillomavirus [HPV] 
infection, syphilis, and chancroid). 
STDs, including HIV 
HIV Infection 
• Consistent and correct use of latex condoms is highly effective in preventing 
sexual transmission of HIV, the virus that causes AIDS. 
Other STDs and Associated Conditions 
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• Consistent and correct use of latex condoms reduces the risk for many STDs that 
are transmitted by genital fluids (STDs such as chlamydia, gonorrhea, and 
trichomoniasis). 
• Consistent and correct use of latex condoms reduces the risk for genital ulcer 
diseases, such as genital herpes, syphilis, and chancroid, only when the infected 
area or site of potential exposure is protected. 
• Consistent and correct use of latex condoms may reduce the risk for genital 
human papillomavirus (HPV) infection and HPV-associated diseases (e.g., 
genital warts and cervical cancer). 
Consistent and Correct Condom Use 
To achieve maximum protection by using condoms, they must be used consistently 
and correctly.  
The failure of condoms to protect against STD/HIV transmission usually results 
from inconsistent or incorrect use, rather than product failure.  
• Inconsistent or nonuse can lead to STD acquisition because transmission can 
occur with a single sex act with an infected partner. 
          Incorrect use diminishes the protective effect of condoms by leading to condom 
breakage,     
    slippage, or leakage. Incorrect use more commonly entails a failure to use condoms        
         throughout the entire sex act, from start (of sexual contact) to finish (after 
ejaculation). 
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Appendix D 
Affirmed Condition Essay 
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 Think back on times you have used condoms during sex. Consider all the details 
surrounding the situation very carefully. When you have a clear memory of these times, 
write down why you decided that using condoms was the best choice.  
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix E 
Deaffirmed Condition Essay 
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 Think back on times you have not used condoms during sex. Consider all the 
details surrounding the situation very carefully. When you have a clear memory of these 
times, write down why you decided that not using condoms was the best choice.  
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix F 
Figures 
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Figure 1. Within Groups Differences. 
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Figure 2. Between Groups Differences. 
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